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ABSTRACT

In this symposium article, I explore the link between corporate social
responsibility (CSR) and the threat of greenwashing. In the first part of the article,
I start with first principles, examining the origins of greenwashing, structuring its
definitions, and identifying the economic incentives that lead firms into the
practice. The second part of this article examines the legal structure that allows
greenwashing to occur, and with it, explores the pervasiveness and extent of
greenwashing. The third part of this article articulates the harms of greenwashing.
Intuitively, greenwashing involves deception, falsity, and hypocrisy that
reflexively seem problematic. Identifying the actual harm inflicted by some forms
of greenwashing, however, is much more difficult to pinpoint. The last portion of
the paper outlines a law and economics analysis to argue that greenwashing
might, in the aggregate, represent one of the most serious challenges to achieving
corporate social responsibility in business today.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant challenges to achieving corporate social
responsibility (CSR) in business today is the threat of greenwashing. As green
technology becomes increasingly common, and consumers request or, in some
instances, even demand green products and services, many businesses have
become financially incentivized to improve their social and environmental
reputations. A firm can increase its reputation legitimately, by investing in
sustainable practices or engaging in corporate social responsibility with its
emphasis on the triple bottom line - people, profit, planet. Some firms, however,
have responded to this new move toward CSR by cultivating a green image
without evidencing genuine commitment to change or investing the (sometimes
quite considerable) money that such a change would entail. As such,
greenwashing may ultimately undermine the credibility of even the most wellmeaning and well-implemented CSR efforts.
Greenwashing occurs when a corporation increases its sales or boosts its
brand image through environmental rhetoric or advertising, but in reality does not
make good on these environmental claims. 1 In an earlier article, my co-author
Judd Sneirson and I analyzed the 2011 BP oil spill disaster as a case study of
greenwashing in the energy sector.2 While BP compiled a record rife with safety
and environmental violations, at the same time the company mounted a highly
successful advertising campaign, portraying itself as environmentally friendly, or
at the very least, not as bad as other oil companies, and cast itself as the champion
of alternative energy and environmental causes.3 This disconnect between myth
1

See Tom Wright, False "Green" Ads Draw Global Scrutiny, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 30, 2008, at 84.
But see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social
Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 796 (2007) (noting that psychological research
indicates that corporations are more likely lo "buy in" to CSR philosophies the more that CSR
rhetoric is repeated).
2
See generally Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TuL. L. REV. 983, 1027-28
(2011) (analyzing faux CSR and greenwashing using the 2011 BP oil spill as a case sludy).
3
See Joe Stephens, Oil Spill Threatens to Stain Alliances; Environmental Nonprofits Face
Potential Backlash as Supporters learn of Ties to BP, WASH. Posr, May 24, 2010, at Al
(detailing contributions from BP to nonprofit Nature Conservancy, and noting that "BP has been a
major contributor to a Conservancy project aimed at protecting Bolivian foresls. In 2006, BP gave
the organization 655 acres in York County, Va., where a state wildlife management area is
planned. In Colorado and Wyoming, the Conservancy has worked with BP to limit environmental
damage from natural gas drilling."). " BP ... is now watching the halo created by a decade of smart
advertising vanish as a mammoth oil slick makes its way across the Gulf of Mexico. BP's 'Beyond
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and reality caused us to question whether the law cou]d be more effective in
establishing a cause of action for consumers and investors who have been led
astray by dubious claims of greenwashing or Faux CSR. Other forms of what
Judd Sneirson and I have termed "Faux CSR" involve claims of corporate social
responsibility toward workers or investment in local communities that by
objective evidentiary standards fai) to measure up to reality.
As currently structured in the United States, CSR is a voluntary endeavor
that largely relies on the alignment of environmental consciousness and long-term
firm reputation with shareholder value, the consciences of corporate managers
and directors, and the goodwill of consumers and investors toward a p]anet and
people-friendly vision. While ideally, the aspects of the triple bottom line would
align, the reality at times is far more complicated. Furthermore, the challenge that
greenwashing poses to CSR strikes at its very core and indeed, may threaten to
undermine its existence. As CSR depends on the support of consumers and
investors, if these groups suspect they are being defrauded, they will be more
inclined to dismiss all such claims of CSR and corporate environmentalism,
regardless of whether those claims are accurate. Such dismissal and cynicism
could be seriously detrimental to the CSR endeavor.
In this symposium article, I explore the concept of greenwashing in more
depth. In the first part of the article, I start with first principles, looking at the
origins of greenwashing, its definitions, and identifying the economic incentives
that Jead firms into the practice. The second part of this article examines the legal
structure that allows greenwashing to occur) and with it, explores the
pervasiveness and extent of greenwashing. The third part of this article articulates
the hanns of greenwashing. Intuitively, greenwashing involves deception, falsity,
and hypocrisy that reflexively seem problematic. Precisely identifying the actual
hann inflicted by some forms of greenwashing) however, may sometimes be
more difficult to pinpoint. The last portion of the paper outlines the law and
economics analysis to argue that greenwashing might) in the aggregate, represent
one of the most serious challenges to achieving corporate social responsibility in
business today.

Petroleum' campaign had positioned the company on the green side of energy development. But its
sunk.en drilling platform - and the resulting environmental catastrophe - has sent it firmly back
into the dirty carbon company territory." Peter D. Hart & Dan McGinn, Advice for BP's
Reputation Crisis, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2010, at A 19. BP has indeed fallen from grace as a result
of the oil spill, garnering a "devastating 4-to- l negative-to-positive ratio on feelings about the
company." Id.; see also Ron Lieber, Driving Past the BP Station, and Tilting at Windmills, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2010, at BI (noting consumer boycotts of BP gas stations).
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I. DEFJNITJON AND THE INCENTIVES TO GREENWASH

The term "greenwashing" has often been used more colloquially or
polemically than systematically, and so this section returns to first principles in
order to examine how the term originated as well as its many definitions. The
second sub-part amplifies the economic incentives that lead firms to engage in
greenwashing behavior.
A. Origins and Definitions of Greenwashing

Since the genesis of the environmental movement, activists and consumer
watchdogs have noted that certain claims of corporate social responsibility were
potentially dubious, misleading, inflated, or intended to deceive. For example, in
the 1960s, groundbreaking environmentalist Rachel Carson, whose book Silent
Spring called attention to the environmental impact of pesticides, noted
misleading "green" advertising by chemical companies.4
While somewhat apocryphal, many trace the origin of the term
"greenwashing" to a 1986 essay by American environmentalist, Jay Westerveld,
who wrote about a sign in a hotel where he was a guest. 5 As described in accounts
of the essay, the sign urged patrons to use fewer towels during their stay. The sign
claimed that using fewer towels would help the environment through lower
consumption of both laundry detergent and energy. Westerveld, however,
claimed that the real purpose of the sign was to increase hotel profits by saving on
the labor costs of washing the towels. As such the sign evidenced deception environmental concerns were falsely being enlisted for profits. Instead of
"whitewashing," i.e., using white paint to cover over dirt in a shallow or
transparent way, the colorful term "greenwashing" came to be used to signify
misleading claims as they applied to the environment.
Since that time, various environmental groups have objected to the use of
the "green" label or "green" advertising was being used in problematic ways.6 As
Joshua Karliner wrote in his 1997 book, The Corporate Planet: Ecology and
Politics in the Age of Globalization;

4

See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 30-3 I (I 962).
See Alice Rawsthom, The Toxic Side of Being, Literally, Green, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/arts/05iht-design5 .html?pagewanted=all (referring to a 1986
Jay Westerveld essay as the origin of the term "greenwashing"). While extensive Internet and
database searching revealed many secondary references to the Westerveld essay as the genesis of
the term, there are no definitive citations provided for the essay. Nor is the Westerveld essay
available online. The author sent several emails to Westerveld to confirm a citation, but no reply
has been received as of the date of this writing.
6
Cf Tom Wright, supra note I, at 84 (noting how environmental advocates support increased
regulatory vigilance over greenwashing).
5
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[T]he corporate world went to great Jengths to market itself and
its products as the greenest of the green. One-fourth of all new
household products that came on to the market in the United
States around the time of "Earth Day 20" advertised themselves as
"recyclabJe, "biodegradable" "ozone friendly" or "compostable."
Simultaneously, some of the world's greatest polluters spent
millions putting on a shiny new coat of green paint - both
literally and figuratively. DuPont worked with Madison Avenue
giant BBDO to produce an ad full of seals clapping, whales and
dolphins jumping and flamingos flying, all set to Beethoven's
'"Ode to Joy," to project its newfound green image.7
Historically, then, greenwashing has been with us almost as long as it "being
green" has been seen as desirable. As Jong as consumers continue to look more
favorably upon green products and services, then there is a marketing and public
relations advantage to being perceived as engaged in a positive environmental
approach.
At present, there is neither an official statutory definition nor common
Jaw elements of a tort of "greenwashing" that would systematize our
understanding in a legal, doctrinal sense. However, there are a group of doctrines
around false advertising and securities fraud that police some of the more
egregious example in this area. The origins of the term suggest elements of
deception, deployment of CSR as a distraction, and an element of hypocrisy, but
again, a more systematic definition of greenwashing has generally been lacking.
TerraChoice, a division of product testing and certification company
Underwriters Laboratories, recently attempted to define "The Seven Sins of
Greenwashing." While the sins only referred to green products, per se, they
provide a useful structure for identifying and classifying greenwashing. 8 The
more straightforward and obvious sins include: no proof; vagueness; fibbing; and
worshipping false labels (fake endorsements). 9 While these sins seem clear, the
other forms of greenwashing are complicated, yet just as potentially misleading to
the consumer.
For example, in the sin of "hidden tradeoffs," a product is defined as
green based on one attribute, but there may have been other environmental factors
at play that make the product less than optimal for the environment. 10 A

7

J OSHUA KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANET: ECOLOGY AND POLITICS fN THE AGE OF

GLOBALIZATION 171 ( 1997).
8

See generally The Seven Sins, UNDERWRITERS LABS., http://sinsofg renewashing.org/findings/th
e-seven-sins (lasl visited Mar. 9, 2014) (noting seven ways to identify the use of greenwashing in
advertisements).
9
See id.
10
See id.
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packaging claim may also commit the "sin of irrelevance," touting a factor (such
as no CFCs) when there is already a legal rule in place against it. While not a lie,
per se, such product marketing may be designed to over-state a product's green
nature and may ultimately misled consumers. 11 Finally, the sin of "lesser of two
evils" tries to minimize the harm done by the category of goods overall. So, for
example, a greenwashing company might tout the fuel-saving benefits of its
hybrid SlNs even though hybrid SlNs overall consume more gas than smaller
non-hybrid cars. 12 The categorization of these sins is useful in trying to analyze
an overall definition of greenwashing.
Another attempt to define greenwashing can be found in the law review
literature. In an recent article, Professor Lesley Wexler explored legal definitions
of the term "whitewashing." 13 While Professor Wexler's article focused more on
labor and employment practices and the recent gender discrimination lawsuits
against WalMart, her article also set forth a useful, and broader, definitional
rubric for whitewashing. 14 As noted there:
[A]s a conceptual matter, a whitewash has three essential
components: an underlying defect, an attempt to conceal the
defect by diverting attention, and a failure to fix the underlying
defect. By extension, I define extralegal washing as (I) a
wrongdoer's (2) deployment and publicity of policies and
practices (3) in response to the identification of a legal grievance,
(4) which does not address the underlying concern of the
aggrieved and (5) is intended to establish, maintain, burnish, or

restore institutional reputation. 15
These elements are useful as an analytical tool for understanding greenwashing as
a type of distraction, or diversionary tactic. Under Professor Wexler's framework,
there is wrongdoing, distraction in the form of a "wash," and at its heart, an
underlying structural problem never receives proper redress.
I would further elaborate on Professor Wexler' s framework to say that the
elements suggest not merely diversion, but deception. The elements of the
whitewash she describes also speak to hypocrisy. As pointed out by the vast
variety of the "Seven Sins," greenwashing may come in many forms, some of
which may fall outside of this framework. Ultimately, what is clear is many firms

11

See id.
See id.
13
See generally Lesley Wexler, Extralegal Whitewashes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 817 (2013)
(discussing Wal-Mart's response to the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes class action litigation as an
example of extralegal whitewashing).
14
Id. at 826.
12

1.5

Id.
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apparently engage in some of these forms of greenwashing, however defined; the
next question is, why do these firms engage in such behavior?
B. Economic /centives to Greenwash

Given the norms surrounding short-term shareholder profit maximization,
there is an incentive to promise consumers "eco-friendly" products, but then
deliver goods or services cheaply, regardless of environmental impact. While that
may sound blatant, the incentive to shirk the promises and obligations described
in advertising (which run to an uncertain environmental or social constituency
outside the firm), are certainly present without much in the way of countervailing
forces to check them. That said, ethical companies will stand by their CSR
commitments and follow through with their obligations. ls there any way to
predict which companies will fall prey to the lure of greenwashing?
Currently, there are a range of levels of CSR, indicating that a choice
exists as to how much CSR a firm may engage in. At the bottom of such ranges
are firms that break the law, or treat law as price, paying fines or penalties in
order to run their business at the edge of what may be ultra vires. 16 Other firms
operate at the level of legal compliance, but make no effort toward CSR. While
that may seem problematic, Professor Joseph Grundfest notes that merely the act
of complying means that many important laws, regulations, and decrees that are
embodied in regulatory acts are followed; he suggests that on its own compliance
results in a large amount of (regulatory-mandated) corporate pro-social
behavior. 17 Of course some firms strive for additional CSR, and many of these
firms engage in charitable giving. Through corporate donations to local or
national non-profits, these firms cooperate to advance social goals. At the same
time, these kinds of corporate philanthropy programs may be more "bolted on"
than "baked in" to a finn' s business model.
Other finns voluntarily decide to take CSR to the next level, for example,
integrating triple bottom line concepts into their definition of long-term growth
and company success. 18 Finally, firms that are at the highest levels of CSR design
their business model to maximize CSR Such companies may almost seem a
hybrid of the best that for-profit and non-profit businesses have to offer. In recent
years, in the jurisdictions that offer them, such businesses may have the option to
organize as a B Corporation or flexible purpose corporation.
16

These classifications and levels are elaborated in Janet Kerr, The Creative Capitalism
Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV.
831, 857 (2008) and Marcel van Mrrewijk & Marco Werre, Multiple Levels of Corporate
Sustainability, 44 J. Bus. ETHICS 107, 112 (2003).
1
17
Hofstra University, Joseph Grund/est: Social Responsibility and Business in the 21' Century,
YouTUBE (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CGjAOaD5RmQ&feature=share.
18

van Mrrewijk & Werre, supra note 16, at 112.
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The levels are important to consider based on commitment level and the
incentives that lead firms to greenwash. When incentives for profit and social
goals align, we have an easy question. In some instances, a firm may decide to
engage in "green behavior" not because it is good for the environment, but for
cost-savings reasons. There is nothing wrong with trimming waste and
streamlining emissions, regardless of the reason behind it. Indeed, many have
pointed out that if a business is clever, it can do both - make a profit and do right
by its employees and the environment. But if a CSR measure is undertaken
because of cost savings, the commitment to CSR more generally may look far
different than if that same measure is undertaken to promote social goals. The
difficult questions arise when the incentives do not align. If a business is merely
at the level of compliance or even bolted on CSR, then when faced with difficult
tradeoffs where cost savings and the environment clash, the environment will,
most likely, lose. Intent matters, not because of ideological purity, per se, but
because a true commitment to CSR involves a long-term set of goals and values,
even when those goals conflict with profit.
For example, if a large big box retailer decides to cut some of its
extraneous packaging in order to save costs, and (incidentally) the cut will save
trees and reduce carbon emissions from shipping, we may say that intent makes
no difference. There will be positive environmental benefits from the cost savings
measure, so why should we care about why the action was implemented? But
such a program undertaken for cost savings measures will look very different
from a program that has the environmental concerns at the forefront. If these
concerns are built into the CSR program, they will not be so easily sacrificed if
cost savings or structures change in the future. If for example, packing materials
suddenly became extremely cheap, the firm that had adopted the green practices
only because of cost could very well abandon those practices. The firm that had
ethically committed on a deeper level to CSR, on the other hand, would likely
continue. And so the question is actually one of thoughtful design and long-term
implementation of the values underlying CSR.
JI. LEGAL lNFRASTRlJCTURR AND THE PERVASfVENESS OF GREENWASHING

Whj]e there are legal possibilities for policing or enforcing CSR claims,
which would in turn cut down the incentives for firms to engage in greenwashing,
at present these are mostly only proposals or possibilities of reform. In the
meantime, the regulatory environment remains, in the words of commentators
Magali Delmas and Vanessa Burbano, "lax and uncertain." 19 Rather than provide
guidelines that would enforce accountability, firms instead must navigate
19

Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 CAL.

REV. 64, 69 (2011 ).

MGMT.

Ed. 2]

The Law and Economics ofCorporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing

289

uncertain regulatory structures. As noted in the previous section, this patchwork
form of regulation creates incentives to shirk and to greenwash.
A. The Patchwork ofRegulation Against Greenwashing

In our previous article, Judd Sneirson and I noted that BP was a "free
rider" on the CSR efforts of other firms and the public's goodwill toward
companies involved in socially responsible practices.20 The gap that BP so
effectively exploited - to take advantage of the public relations upside of CSR
without actually expending the time or money to integrate or engage in it - is
potentially dangerous for those who care about CSR, because it could ultimately
result in the erosion of positive sentiment toward companies that in reality are
actually engaged in meaningful CSR. In our previous work, we suggested a
number of possibilities to police greenwashing and Faux CSR, including:
remedies under false advertising laws; claims under the securities fraud laws;
private standard-setting by independent organizations or other watchdogs; and the
newly established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.21
As we noted, there are few reported cases based on a theory of faux CSR
for false advertising, and those that have been brought typically concern specific
product labeling that asserted the product was "green." For example, successful
claims have been made against insecticide companies that labeled their products
as safe or environmentally friendly, when that was not the case.22 In addition,
cases have also been brought based on the use of the word "recycled,"
23
"recyclable," or "biodegradable," all which now have strict legal definitions.
Although these cases dealt with false representation claims concerning product
labeling, the claim of false advertising around an environmental claim could be
seen as analogous.
4
In addition, the California Supreme Court decision in Nike v. Kaskybrought a great deal of attention to Faux CSR. Plaintiffs brought an action under
California's false advertising law against Nike for making assertions about its
labor practices, and the lower courts had summarily dismissed their actions on
free speech grounds.25 Holding that Nike's assertions were commercial speech
and thus subject to a lower level of constitutional protection, the California

° Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 2 at 1036.

2

21

Id. at 986.
See Douglass M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 62 U. PtTI. L. REv. 60S, 646 (2001) (citing case); John M. Church, A Market
Solution to Green Marketing: Some l essons from the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV.
245, 301-04 (1994) (citing cases).
23
Church, supra note 22, at 30S.
24
Nike v. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
25
Id. at 274.
22
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Supreme Court remanded the case for further factual findings to see if Nike's
statements were, indeed, false. 26 As the Nike court stated:
Our holding, based on decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, in no way prohibits any business enterprise from speaking
out on issues of public importance or from vigorously defending
its own labor practices. It means only that when a business
enterprise, to promote and defend its sales and profits, makes
factual representations about its own products or its own
operations, it must speak truthfully. 27
The case later settled out of court with Nike's promising to fix various issues,
subject itself to third-party monitoring, and make a monetary payment to a
worker's advocacy non-profit group. While many commentators have discussed
Nike v. Kasky as a promising avenue to keep corporations honest regarding
worker rights, it is more tantalizing than fulfilling, as the issue itself was never
litigated and the Supreme Court of the United States never heard the case.28
With that said, the issue is likely an open one; but if "green" claims were
a significant part of a company's consumer marketing, and consumers did,
indeed, rely on false statements, the corporation's claims would only be accorded
the (lesser) deference afforded to commercial speech. State governments retain
the right to regulate commercial speech that is false or misleading, and this could
pave the way for actions based on a claim of greenwashing or faux CSR.
Another cause of action could lie with investors under Section l 0(b) and
Rule l0b-5 for securities fraud. lOb-5 requires that a plaintiff show a material
misstatement or actionable omission of fact, made with scienter, on which
another justifiably relies, causing damages. 29 Securities fraud additionally
26

See id. at 262.
Id. at 247.
28
Robert L. Kerr, From Sullivan to Nike: Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark Free Speech
Case Be Subverted to Immunize False Advertising, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 525 (2004) (focusing on
27

the social value in protecting some false speech in the discussion of public issues); Tamara R.
Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike's Quest for a Constitutional Right to lie, 78 TEMP. L. REV.
151 (2005) (arguing that Nike was engaging in marketing and that Nike attempted to raise a First
Amendment defense to fraud); Michele Sutton, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: CSR
Reporting and Potential Legal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1159
(2004)(examining the issue of firms forfeiting profits in the social interest in the environmental
realm); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-But-Going-Nowhere Commercial
Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & PoL'Y, 383 (2005) (arguing that when expression is at issue,
intermediate or strict scrutiny should be applied to commercial speech); David C. Vladeck,
Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004)
( evaluating the impact of Nike on the commercial speech doctrine).
29
Compare WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 727 (5th ed. 1984)
(common law fraud) with Dura Phanns. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (fraud actions
under Section I OB and Rule I Ob-5) and Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
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requires that the fraud be "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security";30
if the security is traded on an efficient market such as the New York Stock
1
Exchange, reliance can be presumed under the "fraud on the market theory";3
and, regarding causation, the plaintiff must show both that the misstatement or
omission caused the purchase or sale (transaction causation) and that the
misstatement or omission caused the complained-of loss (loss causation).32
A Sixth Circuit case raises a key obstacle that plaintiffs will likely face in
bringing any sort of action for CSR fraud under the securities laws: showing
materiality.33 In the Sixth Circuit case, Ford was charged with securities fraud for
34
its statements regarding the safety of the tires installed on the Ford Explorer.
Plaintiffs noted that they were in part suing Ford for calling itself a "socially
responsible company" while meanwhile marketing products that were dangerous.
The court there dismissed the claim, stating the foHowing about Ford's claim that
it was "a leader in corporate social responsibility":

Such statements are either mere corporate puffery or hyperbole
that a reasonable investor would not view as significantly
changing the general gist of available information, and thus, are
not material, even if they were misleading. All public companies
praise their products and their objectives. Courts everywhere
"have demonstrated a willingness to find immaterial as a matter of
law a certain kind of rosy affirmation commonly heard from
corporate managers and numbingly familiar to the marketplaceloosely optimistic statements that are so vague, so lacking in
specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the speaker,
that no reasonable investor could find them important to the total
mix of information available. "35
And, indeed, one of the concerns or problems that investors bringing an action
against a company like BP might face is that it might be difficult to point to one
fact specifically identified as false, 36 or that even if that were easy to prove, that
the statement was material.

30

See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-48.
32
See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341-42 (distinguishing between transaction and loss causation).
33
In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., Class Action, 381 F.3d 563, 570-571 (6th Cir. 2004); see Kerr,
supra note 16, at 857 (2008); David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate
Performance: The Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL.
L. 151 (2004).
34
In re Ford Motor Co., 381 F .3d at 570-71.
35
Id. at571-72.
36
See generally, David Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006)
(discussing puffery).
31
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However, as socially conscious investing increases in volume and
37
popularity, the materiality hurdle may not seem so insurmountable. As two
commentators noted, a "large institutional investor or a class of socially
responsible mutual funds may have a more objective basis for relying on nonfinancial company statements, policies and practices. In other words, once a
company states a position on climate change or child labor, there is no going
backwards in the marketplace without first retracting or re-establishing
performance expectations once they are made."38 Such funds explicitly make
their investment decisions based on the triple bottom line. In light of these
investment criteria, it becomes difficult to say that CSR would be anything else
other than material to the investment decision.
Over the years, there have been calls for both more disclosure of the true
state of a company's environmental record and for the creation of a remedy for
fraudulent or misleading claims of CSR. For example, in 1999, Professor Cynthia
Williams wrote an article in the Harvard Law Review, arguing that the SEC
should require accurate and standardized disclosure of environmental information
from publicly-traded companies.39 Since then, numerous commentators have
advocated for more comprehensive and substantive standards for CSR
4
programs. For example, Professor Michael Siebecker noted that, much as it is
difficult to test the truth of CSR advertising, commercials and the social
responsibility reports that some companies have issued could mislead investors.41
And, in a 2008 article, Professor Janet Kerr began sketching some preliminary
contours of what an action under l0b-5 for misleading CSR might look like.42

°

37

See George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 22 J. CORP. L.
257, 258 (I 997).
38
See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 33, at 189-90.
39
Cynthia A. Williams, The SEC and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197,
1293-306 (1999) (proposing that SEC mandate disclosure of environmental information, thus
providing a check against inflated advertising claims).
40
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 16 (offering five benchmarks of efficient creative capitalism:
potential, relevance, impact, suitability, and morale); Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech,
Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARYL.
REV. 613 (2006) (proposing that an institutional approach to First Amendment jurisprudence
provides sufficiently strong reasons for insulating the securities regulation regime); Williams,
supra note 39 (proposing that SEC mandate disclosure of environmental infonnation, thus
providing a check against inflated advertising claims).
41
Siebecker, supra note 40, at 616-17.
42
Kerr, supra note 16, at 839-48; see also Janet E. Kerr, A New Era of Responsibility: A Modern
American Mandate for CSR, 78 UMKC L. REV. 327, 364-65 (2009) (arguing that governments
ought to mandate CSR in some instances, like when a multinational corporation engages in various
functions in a third-world country that make it more akin to a government than a corporation);
Monsma & Buckley, supra note 33 (arguing that corporate statements about the extent of their
CSR programs could in some instances be material); Su-Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct and
the FTC: Advancing Human Rights Through Deceptive Advertising law, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 625 (2000) (noting that corporate "codes of ethics" could also potentially be
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Another possibility for policing CSR claims may be on the horizon. In
July of 2010, Congress passed a historic financial reform bill, known as the
Dodd-Frank Act after its sponsors.43 Section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank Act sets out
the enabling legislation for the establishment of the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, which is to "regulate the offering and provision of consumer
4
financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.',4 The
language in the statute concerning consumer education, appropriate disclosure,
and tracking of consumer complaints could overlap with the area of "faux CSR"
or "greenwashing," as these are consumer information issues and accurate
disclosure could certainly influence a consumer's informed investment decision.
Further, in the process of providing consumers education and knowledge about
their rights, it would be wise to help consumers understand whether a purchase
(for altruistic reasons) is actually going to advance the cause that they believe in,
and that can only be done through accurate disclosure of information. As the
legislation and the Bureau is so new, it is difficult to know how various
provisions will be enforced or what litigation will be brought. That said, it is
intriguing to think about the possibility that accurate corporate social
responsibility information could be one aspect of consumer fraud that might
receive attention from the new agency.
Finally, private mechanisms can also serve to police corporate claims of
social responsibility. Before the U.S. Department of Agriculture organic label
was introduced, private organizations such as Quality Assurance International
played a central role in certifying organic food claims.45 Organic food purveyors
would contact one of these certifiers who would then inspect and verify any
organic food claims according to each organization's specific standards. In 2002,
the U.S.D.A. developed uniform standards for organic food and empowered these
organizations (and state departments of agriculture) to certify and label products
as U.S.D.A. organic.46The organic food example suggests other additional models

subject to liability as a form of false advertising if the company's executives fail to comply with
the codes).
43
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
13 76 (20 l O); see also Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial
System, 33 HARV. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 671 (2010) (discussing proposed legislation that became the
Dodd-Frank Act).
44
Dodd-Frank Act, § l Ol l (a).
45
See QUALITY ASSURANCE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.qai-inc.com/about/index.asp (last
visited Mar. 17, 2014); OREGON TILTH, http://tilth.org/about (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
46
Federal Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No. 624, 104 Stat. 3359, 3935
( 1990); see 7 U.S.C. §§ 6503-04; 7 C.F.R. §§205.1- 205.600. Similar private certification systems
exist for kosher food and for green "LEED certified" buildings. See, e.g., ORTHODOX UNION
KOSHER CERTIFICATION, http://www.oukosher.org (lasl visited Mar. 9, 2014) (describing the 0-U
kosher and mark); LEED, http://www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (describing the
LEED building designations).
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for policing corporate social responsibility claims. Private organizations could
develop marks and license coq:,orations to use them upon verification of any
social responsibility claims.
Certification as a B Corporation is an especially intriguing and fruitful
possibility for reducing the incidence of greenwashing. B Corporations are a class
of for-profit entities that also strive to create benefits to the environment and/or
communities. As such, and noted by leading commentators Robert Katz and
Antony Page, they operate as a hybrid, straddling the environment of for- and
non-profit entities.47 B Corporations strive for transparency, and investors in such
firms understand that there may be tradeoffs, opportunities for profit that may in
fact be passed by in pursuit of social goals.48 To date, eleven states have passed
enabling legislation to recognize B Corporation status, with additional states
passing similar or complimentary types of legislation, such as California's
flexible purpose corporation.49
As part of the enabling legislation in the states that have adopted B
Corporation status, the firm seeking such status must show independent
certification that they have met their social goals.50 B Corporations must show a
"general public benefit" that is met through "a material positive impact on society
and the environment taken as a whole, as measured by a third-party standard[.]"51
Each year, the firm must produce a benefit report, again independently certified,
that shows the firm's adherence to its social goals. 52 The accountability and thirdparty verification elements could prove a strong antidote to greenwashing, as the
incentives to greenwash decrease with oversight and accountability. The more
accurate the information in the market for CSR becomes, the more that
consumers and investors can accurately assess how and in what ways they wish to
support various hybrid business endeavors.

47

See generally Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, Sustainable Business, 62 EMORY L.J. 851 (2013)
(discussing various business fonns and the possibilities generated for encouraging sustainable
businesses).
48
Antony Page, New Corporate Forms and Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVT'L L. & POL'Y
REV. 347,347 (2013).
49
BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Feb.
7, 2014).
50
Page, supra note 49, 358-60.
51
William H. Clark Jr. & Lany Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation:
Why It Is the legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and,
Ultimately, the Public, BENEFIT CORP. l, 15 (2013), http://benefitcorp.net/storage/docum ents/Bene
cit_Corporation_White_Paper_l_l 8_2013.pdf.
Page, supra note 49, at 364-65.
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B. The Pervasiveness of Greenwashing

The symposium held at University of California-Davis Law School led to
a lively panel discussion about the extent, nature, and pervasiveness of
greenwashing. One panelist emphasized that greenwashing was mostly a
phenomenon of the past, and she noted that "greenwashing is not a term that I' ve
heard used much lately. It used to be used a lot ... not that it has gone away ...
but it is not as easy to greenwash as it used to be."53 During the panel the same
speaker noted that "it is getting harder to cheat because people are checking up on
corporate performance and products." 54 The speaker suggested that enough
watchdogs and reporting requirements were already in place in order to deter
potential greenwashers. Finally, the speaker noted that "the time is coming where
[greenwashing is] going to be harder and harder to do. " 55 In essence, her view as
presented was that greenwashing is at this point largely an artifact of the past, and

the problem is currently less than pervasive.
First, I should note that the extent of greenwashing, or non-greenwasbing
for that matter, is extremely difficult to quantify empirically. Part of the
confusion is based on definitional matters, as there is a wide range of variability
as to what constitutes a greenwash. From my first definitional section, it is clear
that there is no one canonical notion of what greenwashing is, which makes
quantification problematic. Likewise, the empirical efforts that try to prove the
frequency with which greenwashing exists are far from categorical. The
TerraChoice study noted that 95 percent of green products on the market in 2010
were engaged in some form of greenwashing under their rubric of "The Seven
Sins of Greenwashing." 56 But not everyone would necessarily agree with the
definition employed in that study. Further, while some watchdogs and
government agencies have attempted to report on accountability of green claims,
as I noted in my section on legal infrastructure, supra Section UA, these
accountability measures are hardly comprehensive. Therefore, in some ways it is
not surprising that the symposium speaker noted no particular studies to support
her position that the incidence of greenwashing has been declining.
Apart from these rather nascent empirical measures, we can tum to salient
case studies of greenwashing in order to determine whether current measures are
effective at deterring or policing greenwashing. As noted previously, my coauthor Judd Sneirson and I studied greenwashing in the context of the BP
53

Nicole Biggart, University of California-Davis Business Law Journal Symposium:
Greenwashing (Nov. 21 , 2013) available at http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/publicationsbroadcasts/ symposia.html.
54 Id.
5s Id.
56
TerraChoice, The Sins of Greenwashing Home and Family Edition I , 16 (2010),
http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/index35c6.pdf.
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Deepwater Horizon oil disaster.57 With its "beyond profit" advertising campaign,
BP held itself out as a company that practiced corporate social responsibility and
invested in alternative energy. Consumers and investors wanted to believe that
these claims were true: consumers drove out of their way to fuel their cars at BP
gas stations; investors could put their money in BP stock, as it was listed on
socially conscious investing funds.
In the aftermath of the 2011 Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill, it
became apparent that the "green" image that BP sought to cultivate was only a
surface image, not reality. While spending money on their green advertising
campaign, BP was engaged in risky extraction practices and had poor safety
protocols. The Deepwater Horizon disaster killed 11 workers and resulted in over
a million gallons of oil spilled into the gulf. Yet, based on media watchdogs and
reports in the news, no one would have predicted that it would have been BP - as
opposed to some other oil company - that would have caused an environmental
disaster. Given that the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster happened in 2011, it is
difficult to relegate the concept of greenwashing solely to the past.
My co-author and I also examined another prominent instance of
greenwashing when examining Chevron's "We Agree" advertising campaign. In
2012, Chevron sponsored a widespread campaign listing green sentiments and
phrases, followed by the words "We Agree." According to a company press
release, "[t]he campaign highlights the common ground Chevron shares with
people around the world on key energy issues.''58 "We hear what people say about
oil companies-that they should develop renewables, support communities,
create jobs and protect the environment-and the fact is, we agree."59
Another advertisement admits that the company makes considerable
profits but argues that it puts those profits ..to good use," reinvesting them in
future energy supplies, employing workers at good wages, paying billions in
taxes, helping communities and small businesses, and distributing profits to
shareholders "who rely on [Chevron] dividends."60 And a final advertisement
"agrees [that] oil companies should support the communities they're part of.',6 1
When it partners with a country, Chevron continues, it "commits for the long
term," and although Chevron does not claim to "rep]ace the role of government,"
57

58

Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 2, at 983-84.

See Chevron launches New Global Advertising Campaign: "We Agree," CHEVRON CORP. (Oct.
18, 2010), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/l O1820 l O_ chevronlaunchesnewg
lobaladvertisingcampaignweagree.news (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (introducing the ad campaign).
59
See id (quoting Rhonda Zygocki, Chevron's Vice President of Policy, Government, and Public
Affairs).

60

See Oil Companies Should Put Their Profits to Good Use, See Investment and Opportunity

2001, CHEVRON CORP., http://www.chevron.com/chevron/ speeches/article/03262001 _investment
andopportuni ty200 I .news (last visited Mar 19, 2014).
61
See Oil Companies Should Support the Communities They're A Part Of, CHEVRON CORP.,
http://www.chevron.com/weagree/?statement=community (last visited Sept. 5, 2011).
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it strives to "make a difference" where it operates, particularly in the areas of
"health, education, and welfare."62 The advertisements connoted "buy in" to an
environmental message and to investment in local communities.
At the same time that Chevron was touting its green image, the company
was embroiled in a long-standing lawsuit over its actions in the Amazon rain
forest. 63 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs sought billions of dollars for "environmental
remediation, excess cancer deaths, impacts on indigenous cultures, and unjust
64
enrichment" stemming from Texaco's activities there between 1964 and 1992.
65
Chevron acquired Texaco, assuming its legal obligations, in 2001. All told, the
company is alleged to have "dump[ed] an estimated 18 billion gallons of toxic
wastewater into [Ecuadorean] rivers and streams and spill[ed] roughly 17 million
6
gallons of crude oil into the ancestral territory of six indigenous tribes.',6 The
Ecuadorean plaintiffs originally brought suit in the United States against Texaco
in 1993, but the oil company successfully moved to dismiss the case for forum
non conveniens, leaving plaintiffs to litigate their claims, if at all, back in
Ecuador.67 Plaintiffs refiled their suit in Ecuador against Chevron as Texaco's
successor in 200368 and won a staggering $18 billion judgment on February 14,

62

See id. (describing Chevron's positive impacts in partner countries).
Stuart Elliott, Pranksters Lampoon Chevron Ad Campaign, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG
(Oct. 18, 2010), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/20 l 0/10/18/pranksters-lampoon-chevronad-campaign/ ("The spoof is a direct consequence of Chevron's trying to fool people into thinking
it is environmentally conscious when the company is responsible for the extensive contamination
found in Ecuador's rain forest....") (quoting a spokesperson for the Ecuadorean plaintiffs).
64
See CRUDE (Entendre Films 2009) (documenting the ongoing suit against Chevron for oil
pollution in Ecuador).
65
See In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting Chevron's
acquisition of Texaco). As a general rule, following a merger, a target's liabilities become the
acquiror's. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 8 § 259(a) (2010) (providing that a target's liabilities
following a merger "attach to [the] surviving corporation[] and may be enforced against it to the
same extent as if said liabilities had been incurred or contracted by it").
66 See Mitch Anderson, Chevron Adds Insult to Injury in the Amazon, SF. GATE (Feb. 7, 2011,
8:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/manderson/detail?entry_id=8254 l (detailing the
extent of the environmental damage).
61
See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing the case),
aff'd, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 396 (2d Cir.
2011) (noting Texaco's "promise that it would 'satisfy judgments that might be entered in
plaintiffs' favor. subject to [its] rights under New York's Recognition of Foreign Country Money
Judgments Act" dealing with fraud and due process) (quoting an earlier Texaco memorandum of
law).
68 See in re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d at 143 ("Chevron is the target of litigation brought in
Ecuador by the so-called Lago Agrio plaintiffs in which the latter seek to recover $113 billion for
alleged environmental pollution by Texaco, Inc., from Texaco's current owner, Chevron
Corporation."). The film CRUDE, supra note 65, documents the lawsuit in Ecuador and includes
scenes where the court holds hearings in the field and hears arguments from the lawyers just steps
from oil-contaminated sites.
63
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69

2011, which Chevron is now appealing.70 Whatever the merits of the
Ecuadorean action,7 1 Chevron's critics cry hypocrisy: "Chevron's rhetoric and the
public image that they put forward [are] very different from how they're actually
operating.',n Again, while these are merely two case studies, and not empirical
evidence per se, they provide at least a current image of the greenwashing
landscape.
The speaker's comment about "not hearing as much about greenwashing
lately" is also susceptible to various interpretations. Of course, not hearing about
greenwashing could be evidence that greenwashing is declining over time; but it
could also stem from a lack of awareness about the problem, or from a failure of
watchdogs to pay attention. Over the years, some environmental groups have
accepted financial, technical or other assistance from corporate sources. While
such assistance may help to sustain and foster these organizations' environmental
missions, there is a trade-off that may happen in those circumstances. One
assumes that the receipt of funds from a corporation makes an environmental or
watchdog group less likely to criticize their benefactors. Increasingly, as many
environmental groups benefited financiaHy from corporate donations, it was only
the more radical groups, such as Greenpeace,73 who continued their critique of
environmental CSR programs. Thus a lack of hearing about greenwashing may
not equate to its true disappearance, but perhaps its continuation undercover.

69

See Felicity Carus, Chevron Chiefs Face Shareholders After Huge $18bn Ecuador Fine, THE
GUARDIAN (May 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.eo.uk/environment/201 l /may/25/chevron-headsshareholders-huge-fine (breaking the judgment down as follows: $8.6 billion for environmental
remediation, $860,000 to the named plaintiffs, and $8.6 billion in punitive damages).
70
See id. (noting Chevron's appeal efforts).
71
For more on the Ecuador lawsuit and related issues, see generally Chris Jochnick & Nina
Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New UN. Framework Meets Texaco in the
Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 413 (2010) (analyzing the impact of Texaco in
Ecquador and the struggle to hold the company accountable); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous
Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v.
Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 413 (2006); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational
Litigation and institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. I 08 I (2010) (analyzing lhe decision to dismiss
the lawsuit); Cortelyou Kenney, Comment, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging "Boomerang Suits "
in Transnational Human Rights litigation, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 857 (2009) (arguing that succeeding
courts must do everything in their power to ensure that foreign continuations go smoothly if a
matter was dismissed once on forum non conveniens grounds).
72
See Ben Casselman, Chevron Ad Campaign Answers Critics Head-On, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18,
20 I 0), http://online. wsj.corn/news/articles/SB 1000 l 424052702304250404575558363902469440
(discussing criticism of Chevron's new ad campaign); see also Elliott, supra note 64 ("Chevron's
trying to fool people into thinking it is environmentally conscious when the company is
responsible for extensive contamination found in Ecuador's rain forest and in other places as
well.") (quoting a spokesperson for the Ecuadorean plaintiffs).
73
See John Vidal, Artists Prepare for BP Protest at Tate Britain, GUARDIAN U.K., (June 25,
20 I 0), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/201 O/jun/24/artists-bp-protest-tate.
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Furthermore, the panelist seemed to be under the impression that
government mechanisms for policing greenwashing were far more robust and
powerful than they are in reality. At one point, she remarked, incorrectly, that
companies today "need to report" additional environmental efforts and carbon
74
emissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). While legal
scholars such as Cynthia Williams have long advocated mandatory disclosure and
anti-fraud protection for investors who are misled by false claims of CSR, this is
far from the current state of the law. CSR and any additional disclosure about
environmental practice (above the level of basic compliance) largely remains in
the realm of voluntary effort. As one commentator put it, "Recently, the
Government Accountability Office ... was quite critical of the SEC's failure to
both work more closely with the EPA in assessing companies' environmental
disclosures, concluding that such an assessment was not possible due to
weaknesses in the SEC's collection of information about its registrants'
environmental disclosures."75 Any disclosures, including those about climate
change,76 are subject to the standard of materiality, meaning that the information
77
would significantly alter the total mix available to investors.
Rather than the optimistic picture painted by one of the symposium
speakers that greenwashing is a relic of the past, I would argue that
greenwashing, unfortunately, is very much a live concept. At the present time,
there is no clear policing of greenwashing by any particular government agency.
As noted in the last part, while private lawsuits have been brought under the
rubric of false advertising, they are limited and must point to specific instances of
greenwash; mere puffery about being a socially conscious company is not enough
to be actionable, even in the face of noncompliance.
III. THE HARMS OF GREENWASHING
At first, the harms of greenwashing seem intuitive. As discussed in the
initial definitional section, greenwashing may involve wrongdoing, efforts at
distraction, and ultimately deception and hypocrisy. While these elements,
especially deception, seem inherently problematic both ethically and legally,
sometimes pinpointing the exact harm in individual cases could be difficult. The
most serious harm of greenwashing, however, is much larger than any individual
case. Rather, it is the threat that greenwashing poses to the entire CSR endeavor

74

75
76

See Biggart, supra note 54.
See generally JAMES Cox ET AL., SECURJTIES REGULATION 614 (7th ed. 2013).
See 39 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1452 (Sept. 24, 2007) (providing guidance on

disclosure of climate change issues).
77
See TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (I 976) (articulating standard for
materiality).
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itself. First I will discuss the ambiguity of individual harm, and then examine the
collective harms to the CSR endeavor.

A.

Conundrums: The Individual Harm o/Greenwashing?

At times, it can be difficult to pin down the precise harms of
greenwashing. In order to analyze the potential harms, the focus is on the classic
case of greenwashing, the sign exhorting guests to reuse hotel towels for the sake
of the environment. Assume that hotel management's true motivation is cost
savings, and that the sign is therefore deceptive.
The difficult part of this analysis is that, even while the hotel seems to be
engaged in some form of grecnwashing, the harm is difficult to discern. Does it
matter whether or not the "reason" given on the hotel sign is accurate?
Ultimately, if less detergent runs off into streams and rivers, and less energy is
expended in laundering surplus towels, should anyone really care that some of
these measures are being implemented solely for their cost-saving aspects? In
such a case, where natural resources are actually being preserved, this particular
kind of greenwashing seems to lack a harm, per se.
Or consider another instance, where an investor decides to make an
investment decision based on mixed motives. The investor's decision rests
partially on the hopes for growth in the value of the investment, and partially due
to a desire to support socially responsible business goals. If it turns out that one of
the CSR companies decided to greenwash, rather than be responsible, and the
stock price of the company rises, it is difficult to say that the individual investor
has been harmed. Yes, there has been inadequate disclosure (although not of the
sort that the law punishes, see supra), but if the investor's holdings have actually
increased in value, there would appear to be no quantifiable harm to that
individual investor. Thus these seem to be the difficult cases. But just because
there might not be an easily identifiable harm in these cases, does not mean there
is no foul. Indeed, it is the collective harm that presents the most serious
cha11enge to the CSR endeavor.

B.

Greenwashing: A Serious Challenge to CSR

As noted in the introduction to this paper, there is currently a demand for
CSR, and firms that can supply it may gain an edge with consumers and investors
who value socially responsible business practices. As such, I would refer to a
"market for CSR" where being more responsible is generally seen as desirable.
Based on what we know about how information is disseminated through the
semi-strong form of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), we would
expect to receive signals about which companies truly engage in CSR programs.
That way, those consumers and investors who find CSR programs desirable can
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buy and price appropriately in the market. However, based, on the weak legal and
regulatory norms currently in place, coupled with the economic incentive to
appear to look green, (even when the firm is not), the value of these signals is
questionable currently.
Indeed, signaling in the market for CSR and greenwashing is noisy and
subject to what economists would term "cheap talk." Consider a situation in
which there is a company that engages in genuine CSR and makes efforts to
improve all aspects of its environmental and carbon footprint. Consider another
company, however, that instead of engaging in genuine efforts, largely shirks its
environmental responsibility, but at the same time, spends a great deal of money
on pro-environmental advertising. Which of the two companies should consumers
and investors who want to support CSR believe? If relying on watchdogs or thirdparty certifiers, can those entities be trusted to be vigilant?
Some would say that a conscientious consumer or investor would have to
investigate each individual firm' s environmental, labor, and responsibility record
on an individual basis to be sure of their standards. However, such an endeavor
would invoke extensive search and informational costs. For most casual
consumers, at least, such search and investigation costs would seem to go far
beyond their mere desire to be green or socially responsible by choosing an item
off the shelf. Thus, the market for CSR is a "noisy" one. Granted, there are some
genuine signals, but there also is a great deal of overblown and inflated data in
the market for CSR.
Given that signals in the market for CSR are noisy, consumers and
investors may make assessment mistakes. One of the more frequent errors would
be to believe the advertising that a firm promulgates, only to find out later that the
data provided by that firm is incorrect. Such errors, for example, assuming that
BP was an environmentally friendly green oil company, results in serious ire
among the public. No one wants to be seen as a chump or a dupe.
In fact, if greenwashing is widespread within the market for CSR, then
that greenwashing poses one of the largest threats to the CSR endeavor itself.
Another way to put it, in economic terms, is within the terms of George Akerlofs
classic article, The Market for Lemons. In The Market for Lemons, Akerlof
focused on the market for used cars, and the incentives resulting from information
asymmetries. A used car could, on the one hand be high performing and welltaken care of, a "cherry." But a used car could, on the other hand, be sub-optimal,
prone to failure, and poorly cared after, a "lemon." The seller of the car knows
and understands all of the defects, issues, and problems inherent in the car. But
the potential purchaser has none of this information and the resulting asymmetry
leads to potential distortions in the market.
To take Akerlof s thesis a step further, the resulting information
asymmetries can lead to exploitation in the market, where unscrupulous sellers
would try to pawn off inferior wares on unsuspecting buyers:
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Consider a market in which goods are sold honestly or
dishonestly; quality may be represented, or it may be
misrepresented. The purchaser's problem, of course, is to identify
quality. The presence of people in the market who are willing to
offer inferior goods tends to drive the market out of existence -as
in the case of our automobile " lemons." It is this possibility that
represents the major costs of dishonesty -for dishonest dealings
tend to drive honest dealings out of the market. There may be
potential buyers of good quality products and there may be
potential sellers of such products in the appropriate price range;
however, the presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as
good wares tends to drive out the legitimate business. The cost of
dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the
purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the loss incurred
from driving legitimate business out of existence.
Although in The Market for Lemons, Akerlofused the market for a particular type
of goods - used cars - as his example, he noted that it was merely illustrative, and
that his analysis had applicability to other situations. While the market for CSR is
certainly more intangible than a market in cars, the parallels are relevant.
Some firms engaging in CSR may be "cherries," following through on
CSR goals even when there is little public relations benefit or attention to be
gained from them. But other firms, as noted in the first section, when confronted
with the voluntary nature of CSR, a lack of effective regulatory oversight, and
uneven accountability from watchdogs, might well find themselves engaged in
the very shirking, lemon-creating behavior that Akerlof described.
Among those who lose in these situations are the individual consumers
and investors who care about CSR and find themselves shocked to have
mistakenly invested in non-CSR companies. The biggest loss, however, is to the
foundation of CSR itself. If the market is so distorted by " greenwashing noise"
that it is difficult to tell real from fake CSR, then why should anyone continue to
support such an endeavor? This is especially true if such support is more costly
than business as usual. Is it enough for consumers and investors to hope, or to put
their trust in, what is often unreliable hearsay in order to safeguard CSR? More
robust accountability is necessary in order to meet this challenge.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, greenwashing and its associated behaviors create a serious
challenge for CSR programs. The market for CSR depends on goodwill of
corporate directors, investors, and consumers. If their trust in CSR is undermined,
reform efforts will only be viewed with skepticism and cynicism. Bolstering trust
in the market for CSR may be achieved by changing the mix of incentives -
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reducing the ability of companies to greenwash. In my view, this can only be
done by increasing policing and accountability, either through self-regulation or
increased regulatory oversight. Consumers and investors - the public writ large will increasingly require some form of reassurance that when a company says it is
socially responsible, they may trust that it actually is.

